Complete Chronological Catalog of Frege’s Work; Locations of English Translations of Frege’s Writings Gall and E. Winter, Die analytische Geometrie des Punktes und der Geraden und ihre Anwendung auf .. [a] ‘Der Gedanke . After his retirement in , Frege moved to Bad Kleinen, near Wismar, and managed to publish a number of important articles, “Der Gedanke” (“The Thought “. Juni Alonzo Church, Frege Gottlob. Der Gedanke. Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus, vol. 1 no. 2, pp. 58–Frege Gottlob.
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Gottlob Frege > Chronological Catalog of Frege’s Work (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Wittgenstein in Focus — Im Brennpunkt: Important Secondary Works Angelelli, Ignacio. He put this to use in the Grundgesetze to define the natural numbers. White of Frege’s work in the German collection Hermes et al. In Frege’s own usage, by contrast, ‘purely logical’ thinking seems to require this further characteristic — roughly: Regarding the former case, Frege cites expressive and poetic words as not assisting in the expression of Thoughts; logically, such words are extraneous, whatever their function in everyday language use.
Frege matriculated at the University of Jena in the spring of as a citizen of the North German Confederation.
Frege’s response to this puzzle, given the distinction between sense and reference, should be apparent. The former is a product, the latter a difference, etc. Frehe, these expressions are meaningful, but do not have references. He instead attempted to develop a new theory of the nature of arithmetic based on Kantian pure intuitions of space.
In addition to quantifiers ranging over objects, it also contained quantifiers ranging over first-level functions.
To find out more, including how to control cookies, see here: Frege could then use mathematical induction to prove some of the basic laws of the natural numbers. He was forced to quickly prepare an appendix in response. Oxford University Press, Thoughts, as we have seen, are the senses of complete propositions. Since this is true, then the concept of being identical to zero is instantiated once.
Appleton-Century-Crofts FurthM. Thoughts are, to Frege, imperceptible: He defined a concept Begriff as a function that has fregw truth-value, either of the abstract objects the True or the False, as its value for any object as argument.
Frege’s Conception of Numbers as Objects.
Gottlob Frege – Wikipedia
However, these were not wholly new works, but later drafts of works he had initiated in the s. Normally, this poses no problem.
Gottlob Frege – – Philosophical Review What is perhaps most eer, however, is Garavaso and Vassallo’s third category of purely ‘psychological’ thinking. Those familiar with modern predicate logic will recognize the parallels between it and Frege’s logic.
The one truly new principle was one he called the Basic Law V: Frege and Carnap on the Normativity of Logic. To say that F is instantiated twice is to say that there are two objects, x and yeach of which instantiates Fbut which are not the same as each other, and for all zeither z does not instantiate For z is x or z is y.
We have seen how the notion of successorship can be defined for Frege, i. You are commenting using your Facebook account.
This presents a serious problem for Frege’s logicist approach. This article has no associated abstract.
Citing articles via Google Scholar. Where would he agree and where would he disagree? The Interpretation of Frege’s Philosophy. Black in Black  ; reprinted in Geach and Black  pp. Macmillan DudmanV. Frege probably lived in Wismar until ; in trege years from he is known to gedsnke studied at the Gymnasium in Wismar.
While conventional accounts of meaning took expressions to have just one feature referenceFrege introduced the view that expressions have two different aspects of significance: In giving examples, Frege implies that a person might attach to the name “Aristotle” the sense the pupil of Plato frrege teacher of Alexander the Great.
Mahoney in Benacerraf and Putnam  pp. University of Chicago Press, Infreg year before his dre, Frege finally returned to the attempt to understand the foundations of arithmetic. Frege meets this challenge to Leibniz’s law by making a distinction between what he calls the primary and secondary references of expressions. Frege was, in his own words, “thunderstruck”.
These act-theoretical reframings of Frege have been further complemented by a wealth of recent rich historical-comparative work placing Frege’s treatment of cognitive acts, along with his technical terminology for such acts, within the broader context of leading 19 th -and early 20 th -century post-Kantian accounts of cognitive activity developed within philosophy and philosophical psychology.
However, there seem to be some serious counterexamples to this principle.